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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law: Public Employees' Right to Picket: A problem of
growing concern in the field of Labor law is the right of public em-
ployees to use picketing as a means of airing their grievances without
necessarily going on strike. This was an issue in a recent Illinois case,
Board of Education v. Redding.' In this case the custodial employees
of the Bond County school district, affiliated with the Teamsters, pre-
sented plaintiff with a collective bargaining agreement- Plaintiff refused
to sign the agreement and on September 2, 1964, a regular school day,
the 13 custodial employees did not report to work but with the help
and financial support of the union, set up picket lines at each of the
communities' seven schools. The schools rapidly felt the effects of this
action.
On September 8, a complaint for injunctive relief was filed, and on
September 10, a hearing was held and the injunction was denied. The
basis for the denial was that defendants had agreed to and did maintain
basic necessities for the schools. The School Board appealed, alleging
that the strike and the picketing interferred with the constitutional
duty of the General Assembly to "provide a thorough and efficient
system of free schools."
' 2
The Supreme Court of Illinois rather summarily reversed and de-
nied the public employees right to strike. They stated that:
Although this is a case of first impression in a reviewing court
of this jurisdiction, it is, so far as we can ascertain, the universal
view that there is no inherent right in municipal employees to
strike against their governmental employer, whether Federal,
State, or a political subdivision thereof, and that a strike of
municipal employees for any purpose is illegal.3
I Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
2 111. Const., art. VIII, §1 (1870).
3 Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965), where
the court cites several cases as examples: e.g., City of Manchester v. Man-
chester Teacher's Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); City of Paw-
tucket v. Pawtucket Teacher's Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A2d 624 (1958);
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Grand River Dam
Authority, - Okla. -, 292 P.2d 1018 (1956); City of Alcoa v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957);
Norwalk Teacher's Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482,
(1951), where that court at page 273 stated: Under our system, the govern-
ment is established and run for all the people, not for the benefit of any per-
son or group. The profit motive, inherent in the principle of free enterprise
is absent .... The drastic remedy of the organized strike to enforce the de-
mands of unions of government employees is in direct contravention of this
principle.
At page 276 that court concluded: In the American system, sovereignty
is inherent in the people. They can delegate it to a government which they
create and operate by law. They can give to that government the power and
authority to perform certain duties and furnish certain services. The govern-
ment so created and empowered must employ the people to carry on its task.
Those people are agents of the government. They exercise some part of the
sovereignty entrusted to it. They occupy a status entirely different from
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In undertaking the solution of the picketing question, which the
defendants argued was a valid exercise of their right of free speech,
as long as it was peaceful, the Illinois Supreme Court said:
While picketing has an ingredient of communication, the
cases make it clear that it cannot be dogmatically equated with
constitutionally protected freedom of speech, and that picketing
is more than free speech because picket lines are designed to
exert, and do exert, influences which produce actions and con-
sequences different from other modes of communication .... 4
Indeed, these by-products of picketing which go beyond free
speech are self-evident in this case. It is now well established that
the latter aspects of picketing may be subject to restrictive reg-
ulations . . .5 and while the specific situations must control de-
cision, it is more than clear that a State may, without abridging
the right of free speech, restrain picketing where such curtail-
ment is necessary to protect the public interest and property
rights and where the picketing is for a purpose unlawful under
State laws or policies, whether such policies have been expressed
by the judicial organ or the legislature of the State.6
Thus, in this case, since the picketing, though peaceful, was for
the purpose of fostering an unlawful strike and since the effect of the
picketing was to impede a vital public function-public education of
children-the court enjoined the picketing.
This decision expresses the prevailing opinion on this particular area,
but a basic question is left unsolved: How can peaceful picketing, by
public employees, which is asserted to be an exercise of free speech, be
restricted practically? In a hypothetical situaton, let us say that a group
of public high school teachers wish to air their grievances over low
salary scales in their community. Let us further suppose that no strike
was contemplated and that they merely sought to picket in a peaceful
and orderly fashion, on their own time, in the immediate vicinity of
the school. Their signs would clearly indicate that they had no intention
of barring deliveries or in any way interrupting the normal course of
activity-their only object being getting their views on this subject be-
fore the public. Would this be an instance when picketing can be re-
stricted ?
To attempt to answer such a question, two branches of development
in this area of labor law must be examined. These are: 1) state restric-
tions upon free speech under state statutes or state policy, and 2) federal
those who carry on a private enterprise. They serve the public welfare and
not a private purpose. To say that they can strike is the equivalent of saying
that they can deny the authority of government and contravene the public
welfare.
4 Redding at page 431 cites Hughes v. Superior Court of State of California.
339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local
309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
5 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
6 Redding, page 431.
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government restrictions as unfair labor practices under the National
Labor Relations Act, Sec. 8(b) 7(c).
State Restrictions
The first case in the area of state regulation of picketing was Thorn-
hill v. Alabama.7 The petitioner was charged and convicted of violating
§3448 of the Alabama State Code of 1923 which made it unlawful for
any person "without a just cause or legal excuse," to go near to or
"loiter" about any place of lawful business, for the purpose of, or with
the intention of, influencing or inducing other persons not to buy from,
deal with, or be employed at such a place of business, or to "picket" a
place of lawful business, for the purpose of impeding, interfering with,
or injuring such business. Petitioner had been peacefully engaged in
picketing at the plant under strike.
The United States Supreme Court in reviewing the prior application
of this statute by the Alabama courts said:
Section 3448 has been applied by the state courts so as to
prohibit a single individual from walking slowly and peacefully
back and forth on the public sidewalk in front of the premises of
an employer, without speaking to anyone, carrying a sign or pla-
card on a staff above his head stating only the fact that the em-
ployer did not employ union men affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor; the purpose of the described activity was
concededly to advise customers and prospective customers of the
relationship existing between the employer and its employees
and thereby to induce such customers not to patronize the em-
ployer."
The Court then expressed its view that, "The statute as thus authori-
tatively construed and applied leaves room for no exceptions based upon
either the number of persons engaged in the prescribed activity, the
peaceful character of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with
an employer, or the restrained character and the accurateness of the
terminology used in notifying the public of the facts in dispute.""
The Court concluded that the statute was invalid on its face stating
after balancing the interests sought to be protected against those in-
fringed upon by the statue that:
Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has
the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather
than another group in society. But the group in power at any
moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful
discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that
others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with
its interests. Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be
7 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
8 Id. at page 98-99 citing, O'Rourk v. Birmingham, 27 Ala.App. 133, 168 So. 206,
cert. denied, 232 Ala. 355, 168 So. 209 (1936).
9 Id. at 99.
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justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises
under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits
of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public
opinion.10
It was not long after Thornhill that the Supreme Court began to
place restrictions upon the doctrine enunciated therein. In Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadozmoor Dairies, Inc.," the Court in upholding
the enjoining of all picketing, and not merely the accompanying violent
acts stated, "It was in order to avert force and explosions due to re-
strictions upon rational modes of communication that the guarantee of
free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become
part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be
sheltered by the Constitution."'1 2 The Court then went on to uphold
the Illinois court injunction basing its holding on the fact that the
violence was intimately intwined with the picketing in this situation.
Because of the strong fear of future violence, it was felt that the State
had a right to prohibit the activity as a measure of protection to its
citizens.
The Court reaffirmed its holding in a line of cases following this
one, and it took great care to point out that:
... Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which
are being disseminated. 13
The state courts have often asserted that certain action contravenes
Id. at 104-105.
11 Milkwagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287 (1941).
12 d. at 293.
A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941), in overruling Illinois injunc-
tion the court said: "A state cannot exclude working men from peacefully
exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic
competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an
employer and those directly employed by him. The interdependence of econ-
omic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace."
13 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 615, A.F.L., v. Vogt Inc.,
354 U.S. 284 at page 289 (1957), where the court adopted the language in
the concurring opinion in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776(1942). The Vogt court also stated at page 291: "The implied reassessments
of the broad language of the Thornhill case were finally generalized in a
series of cases sustaining injunctions against peaceful picketing, even when
arising in the course of a labor controversy, when such picketing was counter
to valid state policy in a domain open to state regulation. The decisive re-
consideration same in Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice. Co., 336 U.S. 490."
The case involved an attempt by a union to have the company stop selling
ice to nonunion peddlers. The activity was held to be in restraint of trade.
The court also stated at page 294 that: "Of course, the mere fact that there
is 'picketing' does not automatically justify its restraint without an investi-
gation into its conduct and purposes. State courts, no more than state legisla-
tures, can enact blanket prohibitions against picketing."
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state policy, especially in the area of strikes by government employees. 14
Teachers have often sought redress from their governmental employers
and as a result run afoul of this doctrine. The court in explaining the
basis for the state's policy, concerning strikes by public employees stated
in City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teacher's Alliance, that:
.... We are not unmindful of the disparity existing in many cases
in the salaries of public officers as compared with similar posi-
tions in private employment. However, the acceptance of a posi-
tion involving the exercise of some degree of sovereignty
necessarily implies a surrender of certain personal rights and
privileges which, though properly excercisable in private em-
ployment, are in public employment, inconsistent with the public
interest. Hence the question of the necessity and wisdom of pro-
viding adequate compensation for those to whom are intrusted
the training of our children during their formative years is in no
way to be deemed involved in the present decision. 15
The New Jersey court in 1965, recently affirmed a line of cases
which state that, "... peaceful picketing for an unlawful purpose may
be enjoined without running counter to any constitutional guarantees."'"
Thus the views taken by the state courts or by the United States
Supreme Court seem to have a great deal of uniformity in many ways.
It is agreed that public employees do not have the right to strike, but
that they may bargain collectively, if statutes permit it. If they do picket
and their purpose in doing so is unlawful (i.e. an attempt to blackmail
a local government), the picketing may be enjoined. Also, as a factor
which most of the courts which have considered these cases seem to
give great stress, is the effect of the picketing. Z
14 Norwalk Teacher's Association v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 273,
83 A.2d 482, 484 (1951). There the court stated: "Under our system, the gov-
ernment is established by and. run for all of the people, not for the benefit
of any person or group. The profit motive, inherent in the principle of free
enterprise, is absent .... The drastic remedy of the organized strike to en-
force the demands of unions of government employees is in direct contraven-
tion of this principle." Accord: City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teacher's
Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958).
In Gray v. Wood, 75 R.I. 123, 126, 64 A.2d 191, 192, the Rhode Island court
stated: "There can be no question that those charged with the supervision,
direction and control of public education in Rhode Island are public officers
or officials exercising a governmental function." In City of Pawtucket, 87
R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624, 628 (1958), the court said: "Teachers only in a less
degree than supervisory officials participate in such function." See also the
following "on injunction of peaceful picketing which violates a significant
and reasonable state policy:
Independent Dairy Workers Union of Hightown v. Milk Drivers and Dairy
Employees Local Number 680, 30 N.J. 173, 184, 152 A.2d 331, 337 (1959).
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) ; International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
Building Service Employers International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950).
1587R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624, 629 (1958).
26 Delaware River and Bay Authority v. International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789, 795 (1965) ; See also International
Brotherhood v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
1967]
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In the case of the teachers picketing without being on strike, to
merely emphasize their low salaries, the purpose (i.e. the exercise of
their right to free speech) may not be unlawful. However, the effects
may have such a result. These effects, especially upon their students,
should be subject to close scrutiny by a court. In analyzing the effect
it is well to note that "the right of free speech . . . is not an unlimited,
unqualified right, but the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be
subordinated to other values and considerations."'1
Federal Regulation of Picketing
Section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act lists those acts
which are denominated as unfair labor practices for a labor organiza-
tion, or its agents. Subsection (7) specifically states that picketing which
has as its object recognition or organization may be prohibited. How-
ever, a provision in 8(b) (7) (c) states:
... That nothing in this subparagraph (c) shall be construed to
prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with,
a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to
induce any individual employed by any other person in the
course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver, or transport
any goods or not to perform any services."'
One of the greatest problems in construing this section involves the
fact that the partially synonymous words object and purpose are used
in two different parts of the section. "The introductory language to the
entire section prohibits picketing that has recognition or organization
as 'an object.' The proviso to Section 8(b) (7) (c) allows picketing that
has the purpose of truthfully advising the public."'19
In the second Crown Cafeteria'0 case the N.L.R.B. was faced with
a dual picketing situation where the unions' assumed objective was
ultimately obtaining recognition but the instant purpose of the picketing
was informational. They determined that the proviso protects picketing
that also has the purpose of informing the public.
The appeals court in agreeing with the Board's interpretation read
section 8(b) (7) (c) as follows:
First, it must be determined whether picketing has either
recognition or organization as an object. If it does not, then it is
wholly outside the prohibitions of section (8) (b) (7).
If it is determined that picketing has recognition or organiza-
tion as an object, it still is not prohibited unless it falls within
one of the situations described in subparagraphs (A), (B) and
1Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
1849 Stat. 449, as amended by 61 Stat. 136 and 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. §159(b)
(7) (C) (1952).19 B.N.A. Labor Relations Expediter - L.R.X. 546 b, §54A.
20 Crown Cafeteria (49 LRRM 1648).
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(C) of Section 8(b) (7). If it falls within subparagraphs (A)
or (B), there are no exceptions and the picketing is unlawful,
even if it also purports to have an informational purpose.
If it is determined that the picketing has recognition or or-
ganization as an object and falls within the situation described in
subparagraph (C), it still may be lawful if it satisfies the infor-
mational picketing proviso.21
If the picketing measures up to these requirements the ultimate step
in determining if it is protected or not is to inquire as to whether the
picketing is "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public."
The court in the Crown case and in N.L.R.B. v. Local 3, IBEW,21
drew the distinction between signal picketing, "where the union's pur-
pose is to use the picket line as a signal to obtain organized economic
action backed by union discipline, thereby halting pick-ups, deliveries,
and other services by neutrals" and true publicity picketing, "which ap-
peals only to employees and to the unorganized public for spontaneous
popular support.
23
The courts in drawing such a line have thus held that signal picket-
ing is not protected by 8(b) (7) (c) and is prohibited if it has recogni-
tion or orginization as an object. "True publicity picketing is protected,
however, unless it actually interferes with deliveries or communicates
more than the limited information expressly permitted by the proviso. '1 4
Thus unless the school teachers in the previously mentioned hypo-
thetical were seeking to inform the public that their "employer does not
employ members of or have a contract with a labor organization 25
they would have great difficulty in drawing upon any analogy to the
federal statutes in the defense of their conduct in a state court. It must
be remembered that the federal law in this area has no direct applica-
tion at the present time. Teachers are public employees and "Congress
itself has consistently excluded public employment from the operation
of the labor relations statutes enacted under the commerce or war
power.'2 6 Thus teachers find themselves without many of the protec-
tions accorded to those who work in private industry.
The basis for this congressional exclusion was similarly expressed
by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Norwalk Teacher's Association
21 Smithley d/b/a Crown Cafeteria v. NLRB, SS LRRM (1963), cited in LRX
at page 546c. (2nd Cir. 1963).
22 NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 53 L.R.R.M. 2116 (1963).
23 B.N.A. Labor Relations Expediter §546e.
24 Supra, note 22.
25 Supra, note 18.
26 Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1953): "The National Labor Relations Act of
1935 and the subsequent Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which
secure the right of collective bargaining to employees of employers engaged
in interstate commerce, expressly provide that the term 'employer' as used




v. Board of Education27 in denying plaintiff's right to strike because
teachers are agents of the government. The court stated an idea which
has since been ratified many times by the courts of several states. That




There must be some distinctions drawn at this point in order to
clarify the rights which teachers presently appear to have. This might
best be done by a process of first excluding those activities which are
prohibited to public employees. It seems very clear that picketing in
support of a teacher strike, as long as there are anti-strike laws on the
books would be clearly prohibited. However, even if strikes were not
barred, teachers who picketed in support of a teacher's strike might well
be enjoined because their activities could have a devastating effect upon
the attitude of the young who are incapable of discerning the true na-
ture of the civil disobedience argument. Finally in the situation where
the picketing was clearly not in support of a strike but has the effect
of causing nondelivery of goods, nonperformance of services for the
schools or a substantial decrease in student attendance it might be
struck down under the Taft-Hartley Act because of its effect upon
neutrals to the activity.
There remains a certain amount of latitude open to teachers in
the conduct of their picketing activities. This would be in the situation
where the teachers picketed on their own time and made it completely
clear that they were only publicizing the fact that they were underpaid.
Such action would be permissible as an exercise of their right to free
speech. Of course this right is not an absolute right as both the state
and federal decisions indicate and teachers must always take care to
avoid any dangerous consequences which might occur as a result of
their picketing. But these must be discernible effects or free speech will
win out.
In such a situation there is a possibility that the employer might
argue that these effects have occurred in virtue of the fact that the
teacher was accepting his pay, yet disrupting the operation of the system.
The corresponding teacher's argument is that high quality education
cannot be had without qualified and happy teachers and that underpaid
teachers are not happy. But rather than leaving the situation at this
somewhat stalemated position there may be a somewhat better solution.
This would be a public employee bargaining statute that gives
teachers the right to negotiate and bargain collectively. If set up like
the Federal statute it would eliminate many of the problems experienced
presently in getting employers to come to the bargaining table volun-




tarily. Recognition or organization picketing could be handled as it is
under the National Labor Relations Act, with limitations similar to
those under section 8(b) (7). This would require state legislative action;
however, it would appear to be a worthwhile starting point from which
to gain a workable basis for economic improvement as a group.
Without such a foundation it would seem that any teacher picketing
could be closely scrutinized by the courts. This is so because of the very
nature of their employment, which many courts view as partaking in a
share of the state's sovereignty. If one stops to consider the awesome
responsibility a teacher has in educating the youth of a given state, this
idea is not at all difficult to accept. Traditionally a higher set of stand-
ards and a higher degree of care has been demanded of teachers. Their
professional responsibilities have never been looked upon lightly by the
courts,
The very fact that teachers choose to use such a mode to air their
grievances could well lead to a generally unfavorable reaction in their
community. Their profession could to a certain degree fall in disrepute
in the eyes of parents and local officials. This feeling might well be im-
parted to the young people whose pliable minds the teacher hopes to
educate. Also the very fact that these young people see their teachers
using this means to air their grievances could lead to an immediate
lowering of esteem by the pupils. The gravest result of such an exper-
ience upon immature minds could be a break-down of authority in the
classroom.
This seems to be clearly a possibility. If such a result did occur it
seems to this author that a state court would find little difficulty in find-
ing that in the balance between free speech and harmful effects, this
action posed a ". . . clear danger of substantive evils . .. 29 and would
thus prohibit it.
Upon final analysis, teachers who choose such a method to put their
case before the public may be using a means which is fraught with
danger. While the courts have often recognized their plight, they and
the public in general have frowned upon such activity by professional
people. In a profession which commands and requires dignity to ac-
complish its ultimate end there is little justification for such activity
when there is a legislative avenue open and a federal pattern already
laid out. MICHAEL B. RIcx
Wills: Made Pursuant to a Contract: When Parties Bound: It
is not unusual to find a joint and mutual will' or separate mutual wills
used when two persons, each owning property individually, desire a
common disposition of their property and agree on such a plan.
29 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
' ATKINSON, WILLs §49 (1953).
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